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About the South-South Tri-Continental Collaborative Programme 
The South-South Tri-continental Programme is a scholarly collaboration for Research, Training, Publishing, and Dissemi-
nation, between the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA); the Asian Political 
and International Studies Association (APISA); and the Latin American Council of Social Science (CLACSO).  The Pro-
gramme was established as a reaction to the need, identified by scholars in the South, to reorient theoretical and meth-
odological frameworks of the dominant development discourses; and to improve the organization of Southern research 
infrastructures.  The Programme aims at reviving cooperation and collaboration among scholars of the global South 
working in the broad field of the social sciences.  The collaboration was entered into with the specific aim of sustaining 
knowledge exchange between scholars on the three continents as a long-term initiative.  At the core of this collabora-
tion are the objectives of 
deepening intra-South networking 
contributing a South perspective towards the transformation of the Social Sciences on a global scale 
producing alternative theoretical and methodological approaches of knowledge building 
Networking and dialoguing take place in the different International Comparative Seminars that the partners set up annu-
ally on a rotational basis.  For each International Seminar, CODESRIA, CLACSO and APISA select representatives from 
their respective continents.  Each themed Seminar brings together a total of no more than twelve senior scholars who 
have been working on the thematic area identified for the Seminar, and are recognized as leaders in such area of schol-
arship.  The small number of participants is meant to enable close, thorough discussion of issues, with a view to produc-
ing scholarly publications that not only make audible the voices of the South in the global arena, but effectively ad-
vance scientific scholarship. 
The CODESRIA-APISA-CLACSO Occasional Paper Series disseminates work discussed at the South-South International 
Comparative Seminars.  The Occasional Papers are written by participants from the three continents, and are designed 
to provide an opportunity for a sustained South-South dialogue, and to enhance the understanding of the current re-
search issues that scholars of the South are actively engaged in.  The papers offer reflections emerging from issues that 
are pertinent to the South; and are informed by experiences from the South, as well as from South-South and South-
North contact as viewed from the perspective of the South. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Omano Edigheji, Center for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, South Africa, 
Research Manager.  
 
Send comments to: omano@cps.org.za  /south.seminar@codesria.sn  
 
This paper was presented to the CODESRIA/APISA/CLACSO South-South 
International Seminar on The Feasibility of Democratic Developmental States 
in the South, in Kampala, Uganda 
 
Papers published in the CODESRIA-APISA-CLACSO Occasional Paper Series 
are posted on the websites of CODESRIA www.codesria.org; APISA 
www.apisa.ml and CLACSO www.clacso.ar  as preliminary working papers to 
stimulate discussion and critical comment.  The Occasional Paper Series is part 
of the CODESRIA-CLACSO-APISA South-South tricontinental collaboration 
supported by SIDA/SAREC.  
 
 
Copyright 2008 Africa-Asia-Latin America Scholarly Collaboration Program. 
 
The responsibility for the opinions and facts presented in this document lies 
exclusively with the author(s).  The interpretation of these opinions and facts  
do not in any way reflect the views of the editors nor the policies of APISA, 
CODESRIA and CLACSO. 
 
Series  Editors: Adebayo Olukoshi, Ebrima Sall, Pinkie Mekgwe 
 
 
 
4 
 
Introduction 
The promotion of an inclusive development and incubation of an indigenous 
entrepreneurial class were some of the key challenges that faced Malaysia 
after political independence from colonial rule and South Africa after the end 
of apartheid. It is therefore no surprise that the Malaysian state after its first 
decade of independence and the South African state immediately after the 
democratic elections in 1994 set out to reduce poverty and promote an 
indigenous capitalist class.   This paper will focus on the institutional foundation 
of the Malaysian and South African state that underpinned their development. 
In particular, it will focus on the internal institutional characteristics of the state 
and its relations to the indigenous business class.  The focus on the latter is 
important because the participation of societal actors in the policy process is 
one of the defining characteristics of a democratic developmental state.  
The focus on these countries is interesting for a number of reasons. First, they 
are both heterogeneous societies, in terms of religion and race/ethnicity. 
Second, minority race/ethnic groups dominated their economies while majority 
ethnic/race group dominated the politics and state institutions after 
independence. In the case of Malaysia, the economy and politics as well as 
state institutions were respectively dominated by the Chinese and indigenous 
Malays. While in South Africa, the economy is dominated by the minority 
white population while the black population especially Africans dominated 
politics and state institutions. The domination of the economy by minority race/
ethnic group resulted in high inequalities and the identification of race/
ethnicity with economic functions. Third, after independence both countries 
politics have been dominated by one political party, parties that drawn their 
membership from the majority ethnic group. Fourth, in the light of the above, 
developmentalism, especially promotion of indigenous capitalist class and 
reduction of poverty and inequalities, have been defining feature of the 
Malaysian and South African states socio-economic policies.  In other words, 
the need to promote an inclusive development is a shared characteristics of 
both countries. These two countries have been driven by developmentalist 
ideology.  This means ‘a conscious, strategic stance taken by government to 
promote accelerated growth, structural transformation, social development 
and the repositioning of the economy in the international division of labour by 
consciously influencing the performance of the market’ (Mhone, 2003: 39) It 
also means that its interventions in the economy are intended to lead to 
qualitative improvements in the material conditions of their citizens.  
However, as the subsequent analysis will show, the two countries differ in two 
important aspects. First, Malaysia has more expansive policy tools at its 
disposal in the years the NEP was implemented compared to South Africa 
since the end of apartheid. Second, the Malaysian state is a semi-
authoritarian state compared to South Africa that seems to score high in most 
indicators of procedural democracy. The former resorted to a range of 
repressive measures to drive through its developmental agenda. In fact, in the 
NEP years, dictatorship was fashionable in the world and some would argue 
that it was a necessary condition for development.  However, by the 1990s, 
undemocratic rule became unfashionable following the triumph of liberal 
democracy. Thus unlike Malaysia of the 1970s-80s, South Africa has to build 
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consensus around its social and economic transformation among a range of 
interest groups and diverse communities.   It is only as from the late 1980s 
that Malaysia began to relax some of its repressive laws and to open the 
policy space to the participation of non-state actors other than capital. This is 
unlike South Africa, where both internal factors, especially the need to 
overcome apartheid legacy of adversarialism, and external factors, 
necessitated the participation of CSOs, trade unions and capital to 
participate in the economic policy-making and implementation. 
 
Conceptualising the Democratic Developmental State 
In defining the developmental state, some scholars rely on developmental 
outcomes –success or failures – to define a state as being developmental or 
not. Thus for example Stephen Gelb (2006) proclaimed that South Africa was 
not a developmental state because of what he termed its ‘low level of 
equilibrium trap’ and its failure to reach a pact with its social partners around 
growth and redistribution. At another level, others tend to define the 
developmental state in terms of its objectives. This objective is defined mostly 
in terms of the state ability to foster an accumulation strategy and hence 
economic growth. On the other hand, some other scholars defined the 
developmental state in terms of its ability to promote redistribution and equity 
as well as reduce poverty. But as I have argued elsewhere, if the 
developmental state is defined only in terms of its objectives, the immediate 
post-colonial African state would have to be classified a developmental state 
because of its developmentalist orientation. But it is common knowledge that 
the post-colonial African state is a developmental failure. What seems to be 
common in these approaches is that the developmental state (and the 
democratic developmental state) is defined it terms of its role. By so doing, 
they ignore the fact that the role performed by the state is ever evolving and 
may vary from sector to sector. Another main weakness of these approaches 
is that they tend to look for already made and purified attributes. Hence once 
they did not see them, they proclaim a state as not being developmental. But 
they ignore the fact that developmental states are constructed and at times 
full with contradictions. Hence for example, such an approach will proclaim a 
state with some rent-seeking, no matter how low the level of such rent-seeking 
activity, as not being developmental. One other problem with these various 
approaches is that they did not make systematic attempts to establish a 
causal connection between state’s organisational structures, its relations to 
societal actors and development outcomes.  As Evans in his seminal work, 
Embedded Autonomy, reminds us ‘in defining a developmental state, the trick is 
to establish a connection between development impact and the structural 
characteristics of the state – their internal organisations and relations to 
society’ (Peter Evans, 1995). In fact it has been empirically demonstrated that 
certain institutional attributes of a developmental state are not only positively 
correlated with growth, equality and poverty reduction but that those 
institutional characteristics have significant effects on these dependent 
variables. Evans and Rauch (1999, 2000) show that Weberianness is a 
powerful explanatory variable of economic growth. Similarly, Henderson has 
demonstrated that Weberianness has a significant positive effect on poverty 
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reduction. Also, Edigheji (forthcoming) shows that autonomy and synergy are 
not only positively correlated with economic growth and equality but that they 
are powerful explanatory variables of growth, equality and equitable 
growth.  The importance of these studies is that they systematically show a link 
between organisational structures of the developmental state and certain 
dependent variables. 
This study will proceed along the line of these studies. Accordingly, it will 
define the democratic developmental state by its institutional characteristics 
and would attempt to link them with certain development outcomes in 
Malaysia and South Africa. Specifically, the paper will examine the 
institutional characteristics that enabled the Malaysian state to incubate a 
Malay entrepreneurial class and significantly reduce the level of poverty. It 
will explore the organisational structures being put in place to enable the 
South African state to promote a black business class and reduce the high 
level of poverty among its population. Institutions here imply organisations 
rather than Northian framework that defined institutions in terms of rules that 
constrain human behaviour (North, 1990).  
 
The Institutional foundation of the Malaysian Political Economy, 1971 - 
1990 
At the time of independence in the late 1950s until the early 1970s, Malaysia 
was a rural, agricultural and primary sector-based economy. Also, it was a 
heterogeneous society polarized along cultural, racial, religious and 
geographical lines.  This divide was evident in all facets of the Malaysian 
society. Malaysian-Chinese dominated the economy while the Malays (who 
were the majority indigenous race or ethnic group) dominated the political 
system including the military, bureaucracy and judiciary.  Racial divisions 
coincided with economic and geographical divisions.  While the Chinese 
dominated the modern sector of the economy and lived in the urban areas, 
the Malays undertook agricultural activities and lived in the rural areas. This 
polarization, especially the intersection of race with economic activities, fueled 
the 1969 riot.  The (UMNO) United Malays National Organization-led 
coalition government feared that racial disparities if continued would 
threatened the political stability of Malaysia.   The New Economic Policy 
(NEP), the subject of the next section, was initiated with the aim of redressing 
these racial imbalances.  
 
The NEP objectives  
The NEP which was launched in 1971 as a twenty-year plan (1971- 1990) 
has been described by scholars as a Malay-first policy (Horii, 1990), 
ethnicity-oriented policy (Torii, 1997), an affirmative action (Shamsul, 1997) 
and an economic empowerment program (Edigheji, 1997).  It has two main 
objectives. The first goal was the reduction and eventual eradication of 
poverty through increasing employment opportunities and income for all 
Malaysians irrespective of race. The second objective was the restructuring of 
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society to correct economic imbalances in a way that would eliminate the 
identification of race with economic function (Malaysia, 1971).  The basic idea 
behind these objectives was uplifting the social and economic position of the 
Bumis especially the Malays whose economic positions were historically 
inferior to the Chinese. Put differently, the NEP aimed to create a Malay 
entrepreneurial class and to reduce poverty among all Malaysians. 
To realize NEP’s objectives, the state set clear targets.  With respect to the 
first objective, poverty alleviation, it was envisaged that poverty would be 
reduced from 50 percent in 1970 to 20 percent in the 1990.  In respect of 
the second objective, restructuring of the society, it was stated that 
“employment in the various sectors of the economy and employment by 
occupational levels will reflect the racial composition of the 
country” (Malaysia, 1973: 9). This was to be accompanied by an aggressive 
training and education strategy intended to create the much-needed Malay 
professional class.  The most salient aspect of the restructuring of society was 
the restructuring of wealth ownership.  It was envisaged that by 1990, Malays 
and their interests (that is government trust agencies and state enterprises) 
equity ownership would increase from 2.4 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 
1990. The attainment of the set objectives was predicated on direct 
government interventions in the economy to give preferential treatments to 
Bumis as a way of leveling the socio-economic playing field. 
Government interventions were not however intended to be at the expense of 
non-Malay Malaysians (i.e. the Chinese).  Rather government’s goals were 
predicated on economic growth and restriction on foreign equity ownership 
from 60 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1990. At the same time, non-
Malays equity shares were to increase from 34.4 percent to 40 percent.  Even 
the decline in the foreign equity ownership was to be in relative and not 
absolute terms. This is because the state continued to rely on foreign 
investment for technology, access to export markets, skills and employment 
opportunities in the manufacturing sector. 
 
The Implementation of the NEP and its Impact 
To achieve the NEP’s objectives, the Malaysian government initiated several 
programs to facilitate Bumis entry into business. These included special 
training courses, advisory services, provision of credit with zero-interest and 
provision of business premises. The Urban Development Foundation (UDA) and 
Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) were entrusted with these tasks.  Malay-
owned businesses also received other kinds of preferential treatments from 
the state. They were particularly favored in government contracts, import and 
export licenses, etc.  For example, the Ministry of Works and Public Utilities 
and the Department of Telecommunication reserved at least 30% of their 
contracts/procurements for Malay firms and the Ministry of Transport 
reserved 100% of its contracts to Malay businesses.    
The government also intervened in the banking sector so that it could channel 
more capital to Bumi entrepreneurs. For example, the Malaysian Central Bank 
(Bank Negera) required commercial banks to lend 20 percent of their total 
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lending to Bumi entrepreneurs. Those that failed to follow this guideline were 
sanctioned.   Also, government-owned commercial and development banks 
were set up with the sole aim of channeling resources to existing and potential 
Malay businesspersons. Similarly, the state established the Credit Guarantee 
Corporation to provide security of up to 60% of the value of the loans 
advanced by commercial banks to small businesses.  
Bumis were also given special opportunities to buy shares in major companies 
at a discounted price.  The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) kept a list of 
Bumis applicants for shares and ensured that they were the first to be 
considered whenever shares were being sold.  The Perbadanan Nasionale 
(PERNAS, The National Corporation) which was set up in 1969 to acquire 
stakes in existing companies and establish its own business -- especially 
through majority holdings in joint ventures, was given added impetus under 
the NEP. It acquired stock from foreign firms on behalf of Bumis.  As Emsley 
(1996) notes, by 1988, PERNAS had under its control 96 companies -- having 
a majority share in 69 of these companies. However, critics point out that most 
of the state enterprises were poorly managed, riddled with corruption and 
made huge losses, and thus a waste of national resources.  According to 
Jesudason, the state sacrificed economic efficiency for political objectives.   
The MTI, like the Japanese MITI, played another important role. It facilitated 
linkages between the Bumis and foreign firms.  Critics of NEP such as Crouch 
note that MTI was a source of patronage distribution to UMNO supporters 
and members.  Particular attention is drawn to the fact that firms owned by 
top civil servants, UMNO politicians and supporters were favored in the 
award of government contracts.  In addition, it has been observed that most 
of the discounted shares were acquired by politically connected individuals 
and members of the royal families who resold them at the market price.  Not 
only was this a source of easy wealth but also, it defeated the aim of the NEP 
as some of the shares were resold to Chinese businesspersons. 
In an attempt to rectify this situation, the government set up the Permodalan 
Nasionale Berhads’ (National Equity Corporation, PNB) trust scheme - the 
National Unit Trust (ASN).  Under the scheme, stock shares of well-performing 
government-owned companies and public corporations were transferred to 
PNB. The ASN bought PNB’s assets at cost and sold them exclusively to Bumi 
individuals so as to ensure the direct participation of the populace. 
Participants of the scheme could only buy and sell ASN’s shares to the trust 
itself and not to non-Bumis. This was intended to keep them in Bumis’ hands. 
Even strong critics of the NEP such as Jesudason hailed the scheme as a 
brilliant strategy that simultaneously kept the state managerial control of the 
companies, spread profit to the wider community, and kept the shares in 
Malay hands. Crouch reports that by 1989, 45 percent of about 5.3 million 
eligible Bumis had purchased ASN’s trust.  As I have argued elsewhere, the 
scheme was a good mechanism to empower the Bumi community, that is, to 
redistribute income and wealth to a large number of the Malay population, 
especially the poor who would ordinarily not participate in such a scheme 
should it have been left to market forces (Edigheji, 1997: Chapter 4). Indeed, 
the participation of the poor in the scheme was astonishing, with majority   of 
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trust holders were farmers, laborers and housewives (Jesudason, 1989). 
With respect to the creation of Bumi entrepreneurial class, critics note that the 
performance of NEP was a complete failure. They point out that most of the 
Bumis-owned small businesses were either run at a loss or were fronts for 
Chinese businesses and defaulted on loan repayments. It is further argued 
that most of the Malay businesspersons engaged only in ‘property speculation 
and maneuvers on the stock market’ (Crouch, 1996: 214) and as such 
contributed very little to employment generation and diversification of the 
economy.  In addition, the pro-Bumis business strategy of the NEP, it is argued, 
hamstrung the growth of Chinese business and heightened ethnic tension.  
These criticisms fly in the face of the NEP’s remarkable success.  First, Chinese 
equity ownership actually grew reaching 46.2 percent in 1990, 6.2 percent 
more than the NEP target.  Indeed the implementation of the NEP created the 
socio-political climate for the business community to thrive.  In all, ‘the Chinese 
not only increased their corporate equity but achieved social peace from the 
NEP’ (Edigheji, 1997: 48).  Furthermore critics point out that by 1990 Bumis 
equity shares had only grown to 20.3 percent, 9.7 below the NEP target.  In 
contrast, Lubeck points out that if the shares of Bumis who covered their rentier 
accumulation are added, Bumis shares would amount to  29.1 percent -- 
almost the NEP target.  It has also been noted that not all Bumi 
businesspersons were engaged in speculative activities as some, especially in 
the rural areas, run businesses in construction, manufacturing of food products 
and handicrafts, as well as wholesale and retail activities (Shamsul, 1997). 
The Bumis business class has been described as a rentier class that depended 
on government patronage (Faaland et al, 1990).  The Bumi politico-
bureaucratic elite and the emergent Bumis businesspersons used the state as a 
source of personal wealth aggrandizement. State officials awarded contracts 
to companies in which they were directors or to companies of friends and 
family members.  As Jesudason argues, most Bumi businesspersons were 
involved in speculative rather than productive activities, which had few 
national economic benefits.  The Chinese business class even became involved 
in rent-seeking activities and became considerably dependent on state 
patronage. Put differently, rent-seeking activities permeated the political 
economy of Malaysia resulting in few national economic benefits. 
These critical assessments of the NEP especially its association with rent-
seeking activities have been refuted by scholars such as Lubeck.  To look at 
the rent-seeking activities in Malaysia certainly misses the point. In his words:  
“The less one becomes excessively critical of the rent-seeking and 
corruption in the Malaysian case and idealizes the experience of the 
developmentalist NICs, Chang's description of Korea reminds us to be 
realistic about rentierism.  "The abuse of bureaucratic power, political 
favoritism, and corruption are hardly rare in Korea. And the country 
by no means lacks stories of rent-seeking activity”  (Chang: 145).  For 
the question of accumulation and state strategy, the question of import 
is not whether corruption exists or whether monopoly rents were 
granted by the state to individual members of the Bumi bourgeoisie 
and to the public enterprises ... Indeed, such rentier interventions were 
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probably necessary to maintain social peace, to abolish the ethnic 
division of labor and to incubate a bourgeoisie that can confidentially 
cooperate with state bureaucrats to achieve planning goals in the 
flexible informal manner that Johnson affirms for the developmental 
states.  True, for free marketeers of the Anglo-American variety, the 
mode of bourgeoisie formation is neither inspiring nor efficient in the 
short run.  The key question for assessing this strategy rests upon the 
capacity of the bureaucracy and the  new generation of the Malays 
political elite to discipline, rationalize, and deepen the technical 
capacity of the fledgling Bumi business and industrial class” (Lubeck, 
1997b: 8). 
This is an important insight into the analysis of the developmental state as it 
draws attention to the simultaneous occurrence of developmentalism and 
rentierism.  It seems to us that the developmental state is closely associated 
with corruption, patronage and the emergence of a rentier class, at least in 
the short run.  But the key factor that determines successful economic and 
industrial transformation is the political will by political leaders to identify and 
create a focal point and ensure that it sticks to its developmental objectives, in 
spite of tendencies toward rentierism by the emerging business class.  This is 
evident in Malaysia, and it explains its successful economic transformation. 
As noted earlier, the NEP also aimed to ensure that employment in all sectors 
and occupational levels reflected the racial composition of the country. 
Towards this end, the state invested massively in Bumis’ education. The initial 
focus was basic education but as the country’s productive base became more 
technological, emphasis shifted to technical and vocational education.  This 
resulted in a massive increase in the proportion of Bumis in institutions of 
learning including universities.  But this increase was not at the expense of 
non-Bumis. To ensure that the trained human resources were gainfully 
employed, the state exerted considerable pressure on the private sector so 
that at least 30 percent of their workforce were Malays. In addition, Bumis 
were preferentially treated in public sector employment. The result was 
remarkable. By 1990, the Bumis population had been transformed from 
agricultural to modern sector occupations. The state also achieved its objective 
of creating a middle class Bumis society by 1990, as a large number of Bumis 
became middle class. They were found in various professional occupations 
both in the public and private sectors. 
The net effect of the NEP was a remarkable improvement in the living 
standards of all Malaysians, irrespective of ethnic background.   Absolute 
poverty declined from 49.3 percent in 1970 to 15 percent by 1990, a better 
result than the NEP target.   Also, unemployment declined from 17 percent in 
1990 to near zero percent in the early 1990s. Gross National Product (GNP) 
per capita rose from $370 in 1970 (Emsley 1996) to  $3, 890 by 1995 
(World Bank, 1997). The infant mortality rate fell from 45 per thousand in 
1970 (Emsley, 1996) to 12 per thousand in 1994 (World Bank, 1996).  These 
achievements in social development coincided with high economic growth 
throughout the NEP period averaging about 6.7 per cent annually.  Economic 
growth was accompanied by fundamental transformation of the economy -- 
from an agrarian and raw material export to an industrial economy with 
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informatics being the dominant sector in the 1990s.  
 
State Institutions and State-Society Relations: A critical examination 
I have gone to great lengths to explain the role of the Malaysian state in 
promoting a Bumi business class while simultaneously reducing the level of 
poverty among the general populace. The next logical step, in this paper, is 
to analyse the institutional arrangements that enabled the Malaysian to 
incubate a Malay entrepreneurial class and enabled it to reduce poverty. It 
needs to be observed that the Malaysian state can hardly be described as 
predatory in spite of evidence of rampant rent-seeking activities, cum 
corruption neither did it meet all requirements of the archetypal 
developmental state defined by Johnson. However, the Malaysian state was 
highly autonomous. This does not mean that there was absence of corruption. 
But rather the Malaysian state was riddled with rentierism and lacked the 
discipline that characterized the classical developmental states.  How was it 
able to achieve its remarkable success?  Evans seems to provide the answer 
when he opined that:  
...it takes only a very rough approximation of the Weberian ideal 
type to confer advantage. Even developmental states are only 
approximation of the ideal type, but intermediate states show that the 
basic bureaucratic model can be stretched further and still deliver 
(Evans, 1995: 64). 
In the analysis that will follow coupled with its impressive economic (discussed 
in the previous sections), the Malaysian state exhibited high degree of 
autonomy and was partially embedded. By this I mean that it was only 
embedded with a section of capital, that is, the Malay business class while 
excluding the Chinese business class and broad civil society organisation. A 
key point to note is that autonomous state institutions minimizes but not 
eliminate corruption. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the state institutions and state-society 
relations, it is important to discuss the political landscape. 
 
The nature of the Political  
For most of its post independent period, Malaysia could be described as a 
soft-authoritarian state as it did not meet all the requirements of procedural 
democracy.  Repressive measures adopted by the state included repression of 
the press and restriction of the rights of association. During the NEP period, 
1970 – 1990, the emergency and other legislations were introduced to curtail 
the rights of citizens. Some of these laws were aimed at limiting criticisms of 
the NEP and to silence interest groups and radical opposition parties (such as 
the ban of the Labour Party and the constriction of parliamentary debate).  In 
particular, academic freedom, workers' rights to organize and strike were 
denied or extremely curtailed. Also, unionization was banned or restrained in 
industries the state considered as key sectors such as informatics. It was only in 
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1988 that the rights of workers to unionize in the IT sector were recognised. 
Even this was limited to in-house and not industry-wide unions. This and the 
divisions of the labour movement along racial lines considerably limited the 
capacity of the union movement to participate in the policy process.   
However, it needs to be recognised that Malaysia is not a full-fledged 
authoritarian state.  At best, it was (and still is) a semi-parliamentary 
democracy as it allowed considerable freedom and was responsive to 
society's demands. But is not a classical multi-party democracy  as there are a 
lot of restrictions on opposition parties, which has enabled UMNO to dominate 
the political landscape since independence (As I will show later, it shares 
similar characteristics with South Africa where the ANC has dominated the 
political landscape. But the difference is that in South Africa there is no 
restriction on opposition parties). Elections were regularly held (though results 
rigged in favour of the UMNO led National Front) and competition for 
positions within UMNO was intense.  Because Malay votes alone could not 
give it a two-third majority, and because radical Malay parties such as PAS 
(Pas Islam sa-Malaysia) competed for Malay votes as well, UMNO had to 
rely on Chinese and Indian parties to garner the required two-third majority.  
This meant that the Malay elite could not use repressive measures alone to 
suppress the other ethnic groups nor completely ignore their demands.  
Consequently, the government was at the same time responsive to the 
demands and pressures from the broader society as well as permitted a 
considerable degree of freedom.  What this shows is that ethnic diversity in 
Malaysia was a condition for the state not assuming a full fledged 
authoritarian character.  This is because the presence of ethnic diversity 
favours government’s responsiveness and promotes intercommunal bargaining 
and negotiations between the ethnic parties that constituted the consociational 
governments that run Malaysia through most of its independent period. In 
large degree, this contributed to consensus building around socio-economic 
policies. It is this consensus that enabled the government to begin to relax 
some aspects of NEP as from the late 1980s. Legislations  were enacted to 
give effects to such changes.   
 
Autonomous State institutions and Development Outcomes  
The Malaysian state had a relatively high degree of autonomous institutions 
(Edigheji, forthcoming) that contributed to its cohesion. Like the East Asian 
NICs, a shared ideology existed between the political and bureaucratic elite. 
It was an ethnically driven ideology to promote the participation and 
dominance of the Bumis in all spheres of the national life, a Malayness 
ideology.  It was also built on the need to reduce poverty.  Also, the Malay 
political and bureaucratic elite, at least in the early stage of the NEP, had a 
common background of schooling, familial ties or through marriage.  In other 
words, the informal networks referred to by Johnson as an attribute of a 
developmental state existed in Malaysia.   
Although from a different interpretation, Crouch has drawn attention to 
another factor that contributed to the state cohesion and a basis for a shared 
project by the politico-bureaucratic elites.  Civil servants in Malaysia played 
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a leading role in politics. They were allowed to join political parties and by 
the 1980s could take up elective positions in them. The civil service was not 
only a recruiting ground for UMNO but also most of its leaders had a 
bureaucratic background.  This provided a basis for state cohesion.  In 
addition, UMNO and the government were highly embedded providing a 
basis for cooperation on vital policy issues.  In the words of one time 
Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Razak, it was a ‘government with the 
party’ (cited in Torii, 1997: 221).  This means that strong ties between the 
government and the party constituted the institutional foundation for economic 
transformation. UMNO through its seven bureaus especially the Economic 
Bureau contributed enormously to the policy process and even played a 
leading role on some vital aspects of the NEP. The Economic bureau enhanced 
the scope for economic policy coordination within the party and between it 
and the government.  
Furthermore, Malaysia inherited a significant bureaucratic apparatus from the 
British that enabled the state to intervene in the economy. Recruitment and 
promotion in the bureaucracy were examination-based (although within the 
confines of the NEP objective of giving preferential treatments to Bumis) and 
hence met the Weberian model of bureaucracy. In other words, attributes of 
Weberian bureaucracy were refined to suit the Malaysian situation.  The 
privileging of Bumis enabled the political elites to appoint mostly trusted 
personnel to key planning and decision-making positions at the expense of the 
‘technically competent’ (Jesudason 1989: 78).  In addition, the UMNO-led 
government enacted legislation that limited debates on the NEP. This insulated 
state policy-makers from criticisms by special interest groups.  Insulation was 
thus achieved through repression rather than the ability of the state to elicit 
co-operation from society. This is a violation of the principle of democratic 
governance. 
However, compared to the East Asian NICs, the Malaysian state was much 
more fragmented with multiple planning agencies.  The most important of 
these agencies was the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), an arm of the Prime 
Minister’s office.  As Jesudason observes, the EPU acted as ‘the custodian of 
NEP goals’ and played a leading role in the selection of projects. At the initial 
stages of the NEP, the political elites set the broad policy direction and left 
the technocrats to detailed planning and implementation.  But with the 
increased concentration of power in the hands of top political executives 
coupled with the emergence of powerful political leaders like Mahathir 
Mohamad as Prime Minister, agencies like the EPU lost some of their authority.  
In spite of this, the political and bureaucratic elites were able to achieve a 
workable degree of technocratic expertise that enhanced state capacity. 
Other agencies like the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) 
and the State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs) also played a 
decisive role in insuring that NEP’s targets were achieved. The Penang 
Development Corporation seems to be the most successful of the SEDCs.  It has 
stirred the Penang economy from a labor-intensive to electronics sector and to 
automated manufacturing. 
From the foregoing, it could be argued that a semblance of state autonomy 
existed in Malaysia and conferred advantages on the state in its task of 
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incubating a Bumi business class and reducing poverty.   
 
Embedding the Malaysian State  
Most of the existing literature on the Malaysian political economy has concluded 
that there is a lack of embeddedness in Malaysia.   They point to the exclusion of 
the Chinese business community that constituted the dominant part of the domestic 
bourgeoisie from the policy process as evidence of a lack of state-business 
embeddedness.   In addition, according to Crouch, the Chinese entrepreneurs were 
disqualified from playing a dominant role in politics because of their ethnic 
background. The increased role of the state also placed put them at the mercy of 
the Malay-dominated government committed to the expansion of Malay 
participation in business.  The state-Chinese business relationship was anything but 
cordial.  This and similar other criticisms miss the point. A major plank of the NEP 
was the creation of a Bumi business class.  To achieve this goal, the state entered 
alliances with foreign capital rather than the local Chinese business class, as well 
facilitated Bumi-foreign capital alliances.  The state did not see the Chinese 
business community as a crucial partner in the realization of its objective.   
However, with time, the relationship with the Chinese business class changed due to 
the following reasons, among others.  The fact that the Chinese business class 
constituted a substantial part of the economy made it impossible for the state to 
totally ignore them. Consequently, the government responded its demands one 
way or the other, and insured that their businesses were not damaged.  In addition, 
because of the changing economic climate, the state privatized some of its assets in 
the 1980s and relaxed some of its equity requirements to the relief of Chinese 
businesses.  
Most of the existing literature on the developmental state stressed that the state 
identifies or creates a social group with which it shared a joint project of 
transformation. Any analysis of embeddedness or lack of it in Malaysia should 
therefore focus on the social group that constituted the state’s partner in its pro-
Bumis policies and the relationship with such a group.  The Malaysian State, like all 
developmental states aimed at creating a social group, a Bumi business class, with 
which it shared a joint project of transformation.  Although, subject to various 
interpretations, the state achieved its goal. The state and Bumi business class was 
highly embedded. State-Bumis business embeddedness informed the need to 
restructure state and society in favor of the Bumi community.  The emerging Bumi 
entrepreneurs exercised considerable leverage with government as far as the 
promotion of the NEP’s goals were concerned. Not surprisingly, they were avid 
supporters of UMNO. In the words of Jesudason, ‘The Malay business leaders had 
much leverage with government officials because many were either at present 
members or in the past high UMNO officials and top civil servants. These business 
leaders enjoyed close ties with the government and as potentially important 
opinion makers, found a receptive ear among politicians and 
bureaucrats’ (Jesudason, 1989: 65). The link between the UMNO and the Bumi 
business class became a foundation for state-informed public-private cooperation. 
Furthermore, through various measures, the state strengthened the Bumi business 
class including organizing them into business associations, which they use as 
platforms to contribute to the policy process.  
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What this indicates is that due to the ethnic heterogeneity of the Malaysian society, 
the state became selectively embedded with the Bumi business class which its see 
as its partner in the tasks of restructuring the state and society.  One could 
therefore argued that the Malaysian state was partially embedded, that is only 
had ties with a section of the business community. But it lacked what Evans (1995) 
referred to as ‘inclusive’ embeddedness.  
 
Embedding the Emerging South African Developmental State in Society 
Given the history of conflicts between the apartheid state and non-state actions, 
especially trade unions and civil society, the ANC and democratic government 
committed themselves to state-induced embeddedness. Participation of interest 
groups was seen as a necessary condition for democratic development. In fact, the 
government recognised its ability to promote growth, reduce poverty and 
unemployment was considerably dependent on its ability to elicit cooperation from 
South African diverse communities and interests. The new Deputy President, 
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (2006) articulated this when she notes that the state’s 
ability to halve unemployment and poverty by 2014, would,  to a large extent, be 
dependent on ‘effective economic leadership from government and effective 
partnership between government and key stakeholders such as organized labour 
and business’ (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2006: 1). 
Participation of interest groups in the policy process has consequently become a 
dominant feature of public policy in South Africa. In fact, there is legislation 
mandating the state to consult with non-state actors. Consequently, there is an 
array of policy networks and consultative mechanisms (CMs) at the three spheres of 
government, namely, national, provincial and municipal. At the national level, the 
apex CM is the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), 
established through an Act of parliament as a forum for negotiations and 
consensus-building between the state, organized business, organized labour and 
the communities. In addition, the Mbeki presidency has established a number of 
Presidential Working Groups through which the president and his cabinet consult 
regularly with interest groups. These are the Presidential Working Group on 
Women, Presidential Youth Working Group, Presidential Trade Unions Working 
Group, Presidential Big Business Working Group, Presidential Black Business 
Working Group, Presidential Commercial Agriculture Working Group, and so on.  
Though no research has been conducted on these Working Groups, there are 
regular Indabas (meetings) between the president and his cabinet on the one hand 
and representatives of the various sectors that made up the respective Working 
Groups on the other. For example, the Presidential Black Business Working Group 
enables the president to directly engage and consult with leading black business 
persons and organized black business on pertinent issues such as black economic 
empowerment (BEE). In a similar vein, the president consults with the farming 
community, including the National African Farmers Union's (NAFU) and Agric-SA on 
the transformation of the agricultural sector and land reform through the 
Presidential Working Group on Agriculture.  
In addition to the above, President Mbeki also established an International 
Investment Council made up of prominent international business people, with the 
aim of helping to attract investments to South Africa. The president and his cabinet 
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hold regular meetings with members of the council. These meetings also enable 
President Mbeki to explain government policies to members of the council and to 
seek their advice. Members of the council include the vice President of the 
Citigroup Inc (United States), Mr. William Rhodes; the co-chairman of Unilever 
(United Kingdom), Mr. Niall FitzGerald; chairman of Commerzbank (Germany), Mr 
Martin Kohlhausen; chairman of Pretonas (Malaysia), Mr Hassan Marikan; 
chairman of Independent Newspapers (Ireland), Dr Tony O’Reilly; and chairman of 
Soros Fund Management (United States), Dr George Soros (Mbeki, 2000).  In 
addition, President Mbeki has also established an ICT council made up of the CEOs 
of some of the leading ICT companies in the world. The establishment of these 
councils appears to be informed by the President’s single-minded focus on the 
promotion of economic growth and increased investment as a necessary condition 
for it. The consultative structures (both domestic and international) are intended to 
gain the confidence of the investment community (both domestically and 
internationally), generate trust between members and the state, enable members 
to make inputs into government policies, enhance the legitimacy of policies, 
facilitate exchange of information, coordinate expectations among private agents, 
reduce coordination costs and ensure that policies are made transparently. Some 
of the advantages of these initiatives include the reduction of rent-seeking among 
private agents and the strengthening of the capacity of the state to forge ahead 
with its development objectives.   
 A lot has been written about the lack of consultation by government with its social 
partners around its macroeconomic policy. However, there is evidence to suggest 
that there is greater consultation and participation of interest groups around micro 
and sectoral policies. The aforementioned Presidential Working Groups are 
indicative of the increasing participation of interest groups in the formulation and 
implementation of public policies.  
The advantages of embeddedness in South Africa notwithstanding, greater 
participation does not mean that the needs and interests of all non-state actors are 
accommodated. In the Growth and Development Summit (GDS), in spite of pressure 
from civil society organisations and the trade unions, HIV/AIDS was not addressed 
by the summit. This was one issue that could have aborted the GDS. Cosatu’s 
president, Willie Madisha, in his address to the summit, lamented the inability to 
reach agreement on issues around HIV, which was instead deferred to a separate 
task team (Madisha, 2003). The summit was an effort by the national stakeholders 
‘to commit themselves to a common vision for promoting rising levels of growth, 
investment, job creation and people-centred development’. But overall, business 
interests predominated, and, quite predictably, made very few concessions. In the 
case of retirement funds for example, ‘the life insurance industry, government, 
labour and community organisations committed to work towards investing five 
percent of their investable income’ in unspecified ‘appropriate financial 
instruments’. The trade unions in particular were demanding that more than 10 
percent of pension funds be invested in job creating initiatives. But as we have 
noted above, business did not yield to this demand and this remains a source of 
dissatisfaction for the unions. Although the rhetoric in the GDS agreement seems 
progressive, the actual challenge is whether or not the parties to the agreements 
will fulfill their commitments. As observed elsewhere, South African social partners, 
especially business, are known for not meeting their commitments. In some instances, 
business has worked against agreements that it perceived not to advance its 
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interest. Its continued opposition to labour laws and affirmative action laws and 
policies are illustrative of this point (Edigheji, 2003). Perhaps this is what the 
Cosatu president, Willie Madisha, had in mind at the GDS when he observed that 
‘As always at Nedlac, it is easy to talk, but hardly that action follows the talk’. The 
unfortunate thing is that there are no effective mechanisms to monitor the 
implementation of Nedlac agreements, like most participatory structures in South 
Africa. It is therefore not surprising that the GDS agreement contained similar 
contents as the 2000 and 2001 Nedlac annual summit agreements (Nedlac, 2000 
and 2001). For almost three years after these annual summit agreements were 
signed, there was no significant progress towards their implementation. Indeed, the 
Council was unable to come up with a work programme towards the 
implementation of the aforementioned annual summit agreements.   
Similarly, Cosatu (2005) draws attention to lack of government commitment to 
aggressively pursue an equitable growth strategy (at least until the announcement 
of ASGISA). Cosatu’s central concerns have been employment creation and 
poverty alleviation. This has informed its engagement both within the ANC-led 
alliance and with government. In Cosatu’s views, equitable growth will go a long 
way in overcoming the legacies of apartheid, which are being exacerbated by the 
globalization process. It noted the government’s lack of commitment to equitable 
growth thus:  
“The reluctance by government to prioritise equitable growth also emerges 
if we contrast engagements on sector strategies with the implementation of 
BEE. In the 2000s, virtually every government policy adopted some 
reference to BEE. Government departments drove the BEE charters in key 
sectors. In contrast, it was difficult to ensure government commitment to 
sector strategies that sought to ensure employment creation and more 
equitable ownership” (Cosatu, 2005: 8. emphasis mine).  
 State-Business Relations 
Though for different reasons, a strong state-business relationship has also not 
emerged despite the existence of several structures and processes of engagement 
between these two important stakeholders. There are a number of possible reasons 
for this development. The first factor that has hampered embeddedness in the new 
South Africa was the fragmentation of business organisations along racial lines, 
until the early 2000s. White business was composed of the South African Chamber 
of Commerce (SACOB), made up of predominantly small and medium size firms; 
the South African Foundation (SAF), comprising the fifty largest firms in South 
Africa; the Afrikaner Handelsinstituut, representing mainly Afrikaner business 
interests (AHI), and Business South Africa (BSA).  On the other hand, black business 
was composed of the National African Federation Chambers of Commerce 
(NAFCOC) and the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services 
(FABCOS). As I have argued elsewhere, ‘the organization of business associations 
along racial lines has rendered them ineffective in shaping social economic policy 
through the platforms provided by Nedlac and other participatory decision-
making processes and structures’ (Edigheji, 2003: 78).  The fact of the matter is 
that because of these fragmentations, business has been unable to speak with one 
voice on important policy issues. The need to do this, as well as government 
prodding, eventually led white and black business associations to form non-racial 
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associations. These include Business Unity South Africa (BUSA), formed in October 
2003 as an umbrella body for business associations. In the same vein, the four 
chambers of commerce, AHI, FABCOS, NAFCOC and SACOB, all of which were 
initially formed along racial lines, came together in 2003 to form the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry South Africa (CHAMSA).   
 
State-White Business Relations 
Another factor that has constrained embeddedness in the South African democratic 
state has been the absence of a shared project (shared developmental agenda) 
between the black majority government and white business. This phenomenon has 
hampered effective cooperation between the parties. This was reflected in the 
initial scepticism by white business during the transition period and the first few 
years after democracy, that an ANC-led government was likely to implement 
market-unfriendly economic policies. In particular, big business had fears about the 
ANC’s nationalization policy - the official ANC policy until the early 1990s - and 
fears of the likely interventionist posture and redistributive thrusts of an ANC-led 
government. These fears were carried over to the democratic era. These were 
coupled with the opposition by white business to BEE and Affirmative Actions (AA) 
polices (both supported by the incipient black business class), which were conceived 
as attempts by the state to interfere with the free operation of market forces. In a 
speech to parliament in 1998, Mbeki, then deputy president, expressed 
government’s frustration over white business’ opposition to transformation thus:   
“In the majority of cases, the call for the transformation of both public and 
private sector institutions and organisations, in particular to address the 
issue of racial representivity, has been resisted with great determination by 
the white community especially white business. Indeed, one of the issues of 
great agitation in our politics is the question of affirmative action. To ensure 
that it does not happen, some of what is said is that, black advancement 
equals a white brain and black management equals inefficiency, corruption 
and lowering of standards” (Mbeki, 1998. emphasis added). 
But with the adoption and implementation of GEAR, business attitudes towards the 
government changed remarkably (resulting in surging business confidence that is 
reported in a number of domestic and international rating agencies). Although, as 
the Towards a Ten Year Review document acknowledges, there continues to be a 
disjuncture between the political elite (the state) and the business leadership 
(PCAS, Presidency, 2003). This, in part, is due to Afro-pessimism among the white 
community including white businesspersons, whom Mbeki (2004) in his weekly online 
letter in the ANC Today describes as “doomsayers”, “cynics” and “sceptics” who 
“continue to communicate negative messages about our country whenever they 
travel abroad, or receive visiting business people” and occasionally manufacture 
one scarecrow or another to frighten the unwary about our country and its future”. 
The president wondered why this is so in spite of the fact that ‘business people in 
our country have never had it so good’. President Mbeki’s frustration was in 
response to the position of Tony Trahar, CEO of Anglo American plc, the largest 
conglomerate in South Africa, who was quoted as saying that ‘… the South African 
political-risk issue is starting to diminish-although I am not saying it has gone.’ (cited 
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in Mbeki, 2004). 
Mbeki’s reaction should also be viewed in the context of the speculative attack on 
the Rand in the mid-1990s following unwarranted fear about the health of then 
President Nelson Mandela (as well as the appointment of the first black Minister of 
Finance, Trevor Manuel). This was another way of white business questioning the 
capacity of a black government to govern and to manage the economy efficiently; 
it resulted in substantial depreciation of the local currency and in part led to the 
adoption of GEAR. As one commentator noted, ‘investors fretted about the 
resilience of the country’s political transition, with some fearing that South Africa will 
go the route of Zimbabwe and most post-independent African countries’ ( Handley, 
2005:225.Emphais mine). Any talk of political risk was therefore interpreted as an 
attempt to undermine investor confidence, which President Mbeki and his 
government have worked assiduously to court. This was at a time when for about a 
twenty-year period (1987-2005), fewer numbers of South African manufacturers 
saw the political climate as a constraint on their ability to invest, according to the 
data of the Bureau For Economic Research (Financial Mail, February 17, 2006). The 
government’s achievements in the first decade of democracy seem to have 
surpassed the expectations of the doomsayers, who now seem dumbfounded. The 
by-line of Ethel Hazelhurst (2006) in the Financial Mail, following the presentation 
of the 2006/7 budget reads, ‘The doomsayers were not out when Trevor Manuel 
was appointed finance minister in 1996. Ten years later, and he has achieved the 
impossible’. I have highlighted, in the earlier part of this paper, some elements of 
what Hazelhurst was making reference to by the term ‘spectacular success’. Suffice 
it to say that though the investment climate has improved, FDI inflows have not 
been very encouraging, and this has been coupled with low gross domestic capital 
formation. Both of these are low by international standards. 
I have sought to use the above to illustrate the fact that the different racial 
backgrounds of business (white) and government (black) may have contributed to a 
low degree of trust between the state and white business, just as the relationship 
between the Malaysian state (controlled by the indigenous Malay) and the Chinese 
business class) – business relations (central to embeddedness.  The literature on the 
developmental state tells us that trust between the state and societal actors is 
crucial to successful development. Such trust does not exactly exist between the 
South African state and white business; this does not bode well for the building of 
a developmental state. This is, however, not to underestimate the influence of the 
white business community in economic policy-making. Besides its involvement in a 
number of policy networks/ - CMs, some of which I have mentioned earlier, 
according to Handley (2005), white business influence is also derived from two 
other factors, namely (a) its relative (large) size, and (b) the relatively open and 
internationalized nature of the South African economy also boosts their influence in 
South African economic policy. This influence is direct – through participation in a 
range of consultative structures and processes, and indirect – through its size and 
the exit option available to it (this was not the case when the East Asian 
developmental states were being constructed as the global economy was less 
open, a fact that enabled the state to discipline capital). This has constrained the 
policy options available to the state. 
Suffice it to say that the white business community is reluctantly warming up to the 
idea of transformation of the economy to make it more inclusive. In that regard, it 
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is gradually accepting BEE as part of South African business imperatives. On 
occasion, the white business community has undertaken initiatives aimed at 
strengthening its relationship with the state as an indication of its commitment to 
South Africa. These include the establishment of the Business Trust with a pledge of 
R1bn for social investment (in job creation and education) as well as voluntary 
commitment by the financial sector to invest about R75 billion in issues that will 
advance broad-based BEE. White business’ negative reactions and gradual 
embrace of BEE are similar to the negative reaction and then reluctant acceptance 
by the Chinese business class in Malaysia of the New Economic Policy in the 1970s. 
 
State-black business relations 
Simultaneously the democratic state is incubating and nurturing a black business 
class with which it does appear to share a common project. Consequently, there is 
a more harmonious state-black business relationship than a state-white business 
one. The state is not only facilitating this through BEE policies aimed at creating a 
black entrepreneurial class but also through the award of state tenders to black 
businesses. Cronin concurs when he observes that ‘It is state policies (BEE charters, 
with their ownership quotas and tender policies) that are driving the emergence of 
this class fraction, putting pressure on established capital to cut this emerging 
fraction “a slice of the action” in order to remain in favour with the “new political 
reality”.’ (Cronin, 2005).  
There is a tendency in some quarters to demonise the emerging black business class 
as parasitic individuals who owe their positions more to their political connections 
than their business acumen. Well renowned and respected Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu as well as Moeletsi Mbeki, President Mbeki's brother (an intellectual and top 
businessman), are some of the most vocal critics of the ‘current’ forms of BEE.  They 
point out that BEE is not benefiting the majority of the black population.  This has 
given rise to charges that government’s BEE policies and programmes are only 
benefitting politically well connected individuals.  In a lecture at the University of 
Pretoria, Moeletsi Mbeki argues that ‘We are not creating entrepreneurs. We are 
taking political leaders and politically-connected people and giving them assets 
which, in the first instance, they don't know how to manage’ (2003). He sees the 
black elite as no more than a buffer to protect white business.  He also contends 
“the current model of black economic empowerment (BEE), focused on transferring 
equity rather than encouraging entrepreneurship, has created a culture of 
entitlement and dependency in the black middle class”  (Mail and Guardian, 28 
September 2003).  The main weakness being highlighted by Moeletsi Mbeki and 
other critics of the current model of BEE is that the policy tends to be narrowly 
focused on share-acquisition without enough attention being paid to 
entrepreneurial development and skills training as a way of creating a sustained 
and independent black business class. This is what I have referred to as a 
minimalist approach to BEE (Edigheji, 1999) that primarily focuses on 
deracialisation of equity ownership. Seven years ago, I made an argument similar 
to that of Archibishop Desmond Tutu and Moeletsi Mbeki against the minimalist 
approach to BEE, when I observed that: 
“Another major implication of the minimalist approach to BEE is that it is 
fostering a process of social exclusion in the new South Africa as the 
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majority of blacks, and mostly rural women, remain unemployed and are 
denied the fruits of social transformation – without access to physical and 
social infrastructure. At the same time, a new filthy rich black and 
professional class enjoys the benefits of the democratic transition – with 
access to corporate ownership…. Put differently, a minimalist approach to 
BEE promotes the empowerment of few black individuals and the 
disempowerment of the vast majority of the black population. This has 
resulted in the increased polarization of the black community, that is 
widening the gap between the rich and poor in the black population”. 
(Edigheji, 1999: 7) 
The emerging black businesspeople are also criticized for merely engaging in 
speculative rather than productive investment that could have positive multiplier 
effects such as generating employment opportunities and contributing to the 
diversification of the economy. Flowing from the above criticisms is talk of crony 
capitalism and self enrichment as the main features of BEE, similar to the criticisms 
against the Bumupitera businesspeople in Malaysia between the 1970s and mid-
1980s (Jesudason, 1989). Some of these criticisms ignore the fact that some of the 
BEE deals and government policies on the subject benefit ordinary people. Such 
was the case in the privatization of TELKOM (the then state-owned telecoms utility) 
where some of the shares were sold to ordinary people. In the same vein, some of 
the BEE deals in the private sector, including in two of South African leading banks, 
Nedbank and ABSA, are benefiting workers and communities, although their 
spread remains considerably limited; hence the majority of black people have not 
shared in the fruits of BEE. To be sure, the charge of the elitism in BEE cannot be 
ignored if we are to overcome the legacy of apartheid’s concentration of wealth. 
It is, however, important to point out that at the initial stages of the implementation 
of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in Malaysia, similar charges were levelled 
against the Malaysian state. And in general, crony capitalism was used by western 
scholars and institutions to describe the East Asian developmental states. The 
Malaysian state was charged with promoting a parasitic Malay business class, who 
were said to benefit from political patronage. This is how one Malaysian political 
economist described the situation: 
the successful Malay businessperson typically had close connections with 
government leaders that were used to acquire land for housing 
development, timber or mining concessions, shares in newly restructured 
companies, special access to credit and licenses, and so on. Many gained 
great wealth through property speculation and manoeuvres on the share 
market... The main bumiputera businesspeople were from three groups: 
UMNO supporters, retired civil servants and royalty (Crouch, 1996: 214).  
The point is that until the mid-1980s, the emerging Bumupitera business class was 
initially highly dependent on the state but thereafter rent-seeking was somewhat 
minimised. Lubeck (1997) cautioned against harsh assessments of the emerging 
Malay business class and perceptions about rent-seeking; an important warning in 
the South African context. He contends:  
Lest one become excessively critical of the rent-seeking and corruption in 
the Malaysian case and idealize the experience of the developmentalist 
NICs, Chang's description of Korea reminds us to be realistic about 
rentierism. "The abuse of bureaucratic power, political favoritism, and 
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corruption are hardly rare in Korea. And the country by no means lacks 
stories of rent-seeking activity” (Chang: 145).  For the question of  
accumulation and state strategy, the question of import is not whether 
corruption exists or whether monopoly rents were granted by the state to 
individual members of the Bumi bourgeoisie and to the public enterprises ... 
Indeed, such rentier interventions were probably necessary to maintain 
social peace, to abolish the ethnic division of labor and to incubate a 
bourgeoisie that can confidentially cooperate with state bureaucrats to 
achieve planning goals in the flexible informal manner that Johnson affirms 
for the developmental states.  True, for free marketeers of the Anglo-
American variety, the mode of bourgeoisie formation is neither inspiring nor 
efficient in the short run.  The key question for assessing this strategy rests 
upon the capacity of the bureaucracy and the  new generation of the 
Malays political elites to discipline, rationalize, and deepen the technical 
capacity of the fledgling Bumi business and industrial class (Lubeck, 1997b: 
8) 
This observation by Lubeck provides important insights into an understanding and 
assessment of the Malaysian developmental state in particular and developmental 
states elsewhere in general. It seems to us that the developmental state is closely 
associated with corruption, patronage and the emergence of a rentier class, at least 
in the short run.  But the key factor that determines successful economic and industrial 
transformation, which South Africa needs to take to heart, is the political will by 
political leaders to identify and create a focal point and ensure that it sticks to its 
developmental objectives, in spite of tendencies toward rentierism by the emerging 
business class. This is an important lesson that we should learn as we continue with 
efforts to build a developmental state in order to make the economy competitive 
and overcome apartheid’s legacy of underdevelopment.  
In the developmental state literature, it is generally recognised that the problem per 
se is not rent-seeking but whether or not the fruits of rents are used for productive 
investment as was the case in the Asian developmental states or diverted into 
“unproductive purposes” as the case of most post-independent African states. K.S 
Jomo, one of Malaysia’s most authoritative political economists notes: 
“Rent transfers may well contribute to, rather than undermine, further 
investments in the national economy since rentiers can usually count on further 
advantages from such investments. If capital flight is thus discouraged, the 
greater concentration of wealth associated with such rentier activity may 
actually have the consequence of raising corporate savings, thus accelerated 
capital accumulation, growth and structural changes” (1996: 12). 
Also, Aoki et al. (1996:14) have persuasively argued that “if policy-induced rents 
are provided on the condition of fulfillment of an objective criterion, they may 
induce private agents to supply more goods that are undersupplied in the 
competitive process”. In fact policy-induced rents that are transparently distributed 
are likely to force private agents to act to further the development objectives of the 
state. Put differently, transparently state-induced rents force private agents to work 
towards the goals defined by the state. These points are important lessons that we 
need to be cognizant of in South Africa’s attempt to promote a black business class. 
A pertinent question to ask is whether or not the South African state is setting 
23 
 
performance criteria for the emerging black business class, aimed at reducing 
inefficiency and wastage by black firms while at the same time rewarding those 
that meet set-targets. The carrot and stick approach to rent distribution, therefore, 
requires greater attention as part of the state efforts to promote black business.  
It is partly in recognition of the shortcomings of the dominant model of BEE that the 
state has now come out with a BBBEE scorecard, with five main components, 
namely: ‘preferential procurement, employment equity, skills development, 
enterprise development and residual initiatives (industry specific and corporate 
social investment initiatives)’ (DTI, 2005: 1). A rigorous implementation of the 
scorecard could help to overcome some of the shortcomings of the minimalist 
approach to BEE and by so doing a progression toward a maximalist approach 
would be achieved.  
 In addition to promoting a black business class, the emerging developmental state 
in the post-1994 period in South Africa has played a pivotal role in strengthening 
black business associations, ensuring greater unity among them and that they 
speak with one voice. Black businesspeople and associations have subsequently 
become more active in policy networks/CMs such as NEDLAC, the committees that 
draft the sectors’ charter’, and so on. These are in addition to the Presidential Black 
Business Working Group discussed earlier. As a consequence, black business 
influence on economic policy has increased. As noted earlier, black business 
associations - through the BEECOM report - were instrumental in shaping 
government’s BBBEE policies. Also it is important to point out that another source of 
influence for black business is that some of the leading business people are either 
ordinary members of the ANC or are members of its highest decision-making 
body, the National Executive Committee (NEC). This gives them access to key 
government officials as well as provides them with an avenue, through the NEC 
meetings, to influence economic policy. 
 
Some General reflections on embeddedness in South Africa 
All the above notwithstanding, the point to emphasise is that state-coordinated 
embeddedness in South Africa, as elsewhere, has not been conflict-free. Some of 
the time it has been carried out unilaterally, with the abiding risk to undermine the 
state’s development project- strikes and protests by trade unions, protests by civil 
society groups and communities, investment strikes by business and the adoption of 
a non-negotiable macroeconomic policy by government. Nevertheless, state-
induced embeddedness in post-apartheid South Africa has provided avenues for 
negotiation, compromise and reconciliation of goals between the state, business 
and trade unions. This has contributed to the emerging consensus around a shared 
growth witnessed in the governments unveiling of its new economic framework, 
ASGISA, in February 2006. 
Luiz (1994) suggests that excessive embeddedness in South Africa may have 
constrained the capacity of the state, more specifically, its relative autonomy. 
According to him, ‘In South Africa, the ANC government is aggressively being 
lobbied by interest groups from the left and right’ (p.606). This lobbying, in his 
view, accounted for the shift from the RDP to GEAR, which is a ‘reflection of the 
state’s incapacity’ (p.594).  Thus to enhance the capacity of the state, he says what 
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is needed is an authoritarian form of corporatism  (as in Korea and Japan), where 
the state dominates and labour and business become mechanisms for transmitting 
state policy. For him, this is an option but it requires that the state has the political 
will to enforce its policy, preferably by co-opting these groups (in subordinate 
positions) (Luiz, 2002: 606). 
Such propositions underestimate both the degree of cooperation between the state 
and business, as well as the degree of cooperation between business and trade 
unions at factory level in South Korea. I want to suggest that what is important is 
the ability of the state to use its relative autonomy to elicit cooperation from 
interest groups, in a state coordinated state-society relationship rather than to 
dominate its social partners. A similar conclusion is reached by Campos and Root 
(1996) in their incisive account of the Asian NICs, when they observe that ‘…East 
Asian leaders secured the support of economic elites without compromising sound 
economic policy through mechanisms designed to facilitate consultation, 
cooperation, and coordination’ (Campos and Root, 1996). I have earlier alluded to 
some of the factors that have hampered the capacity of the South African 
democratic state to build consensus around its vision of transformation. Furthermore, 
in the post-1994 context, the problem has been that consultation of, and 
participation by, interest groups in socio-economic policy are seen as the panacea 
for all problems. Also, it is becoming an end in itself rather than a means to an 
end. This is what Monteiro and de Tollenaere (n.d) refer to as ‘a cult for 
participation as a panacea’ (p.11). In this context, there seems to be the 
perception, especially by trade unions, that the government cannot act on any issue 
without first consulting it. Similarly, some of the non-state actors, rather than 
constructively engage with the state as a development partner, and indicate what 
contributions they would make, see their involvement in economic policy-making as 
an opportunity to make demands on the state. Also, remnants of the apartheid 
legacy of adversarialism that characterised state-society relations have spilled 
over to the democratic dispensation. As the East Asian and Irish developmental 
states have shown, success depends on all actors being ready to make sacrifices 
by making credible commitments to the actualization of their shared objectives. For 
example, in these countries, business seems committed to long-term investments, 
unlike the South African case. Thus one major weakness of the emerging South 
African developmental state is that while the state has demonstrated a commitment 
to growth, through among other things its stabilisation policy; and increased 
spending on social and economic infrastructure, both business and trade unions 
have not made reciprocal commitments. Worse, some of the non-state actors see 
themselves as having a veto power over government policies and initiatives. The 
result, as we have seen in Nedlac, is that consultations go on endlessly with 
stakeholders focusing on the minute details rather than on the broad vision. In the 
process, social partners lose sight of the strategic and broad vision. As a 
consequence, in spite of the high degree of state-society interactions in the 
democratic dispensation, a shared vision of national transformation remains 
elusive. Whether ASGISA will be this shared project remains to be seen. An 
important lesson to draw from the East Asian developmental states is that 
consultations should focus on the broad national objectives, with the state having to 
fill in the details. Even then, both the trade unions and business will have to make 
credible commitments and contributions to the realization of the objectives of 
ASGISA.  
25 
 
The fact that decisions are not reached rapidly in some of these forums, especially 
Nedlac, has become a source of frustration for government and partly accounts for 
the reluctance of cabinet ministers to attend the council’s meetings of late. 
Gradually, the council is losing its relevance. Business convenor, Raymond Parsons, 
has rightly argued that where consultative processes become obstructive, 
government must move ahead with policy formulation and implementation (See 
Edigheji, 2003). 
 
Conclusion 
The Malaysian cases provide a new insight into the theory on the developmental 
state.  It shows that a developmental state can be selectively embedded, 
especially in a heterogeneous society, and still achieve the objective of economic 
transformation. As the argument above indicates, the Malaysian state chose to be 
embedded to a section of the business class - the Bumis - yet it still achieved it 
objectives. It is unlikely that it would have been able to restructure the state and 
society had it been highly embedded to the Chinese business community. However, 
the South African case shows that in the context of globalisation and in 
heterogeneous societies, the state needs to build broad alliance around its agenda 
to ensure success. This will not be without conflict, as we have seen in the South 
African state with white business. The paper also highlights another important point: 
embedded autonomy can converge in different ways to strengthen the state 
capacity.  In Malaysia and South Africa, the relative internal unity of UMNO and 
ANC, and its relations with bureaucrats and Malay and black businesspersons have 
largely added to the enhancement of the state capacity. Both cases show that rent-
seeking activities and developmentalism can occur simultaneously without 
threatening the transformative project of the state as long as there exist a political 
class that is committed to such a project.  In effect equal attention should be given 
to the nature of the political elite when analyzing the institutional foundation that 
underpins successful transformation. 
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